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ABSTRACT
Future military communication networks will have a
mixture of backbone terrestrial, satellite and wireless
terrestrial networks. The speeds of these networks vary
and they are very heterogeneous. As networks become
faster, it is not enough to do reactive fault manage-
ment. Our approach combines proactive and reactive
fault management . Proactive fault management is im-
plemented by dynamic and adaptive routing. Reactive
fault management is implemented by a combination of
a neural network and an expert system. The system has
been developed for the X.25 protocol. Several fault sce-
narios were modeled and included in the study: reduced
switch capacity, increased packet generation rate of a
certain application, disabled switch in the X.25 cloud,
disabled links. We also modeled occurrence of alarms in-
cluding severity of the problem, location of the event and
a threshold. To detect and identify faults we use both
numerical data associated with the performance objects
(attributes) in the MIB as well as SNMP traps (alarms).
Simulation experiments have been performed in order to
understand the convergence of the algorithms, the train-
ing of the neural networks involved and the G2/NeurOn-
Line software environment and MIB design.
INTRODUCTION
Fault management [14, 15, 16, 17] includes detect-
ing, isolating, and repairing problems in the network,
tracing faults, given many alarms in the system, using
error logs and tracing errors through the log reports [1].
One of the problems faced by network control centers is
that of handling extremely large volumes of data deal-
ing with the performance of the networks. The data
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volume makes the task of nding the problem a very
time-consuming process. However, unlike some of the
other network management functions listed in the ISO
model, in fault management, speed is very crucial and
recovery from a problem has to occur quickly.
Several eorts have taken place to tackle the fault
management problem, some of which are described in
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Although several interesting issues
have been addressed in these papers, such as trouble
ticketing and alarm correlation, most of the work has
been done through the use of expert systems alone [12,
13] without the use of neural networks. Furthermore,
in these sources, we have not seen the use of SNMP
statistics for the fault management problem.
The expert system approach to diagnosis is intuitively
attractive, as symptoms can be linked to causes explic-
itly, in a rule-based knowledge representation scheme.
The limitations of rule-based expert systems are re-
vealed when they are confronted with novel fault sit-
uations for which no specic rules exist. Novel faults,
for which the neural network has not been trained, or for
which no output neuron has been assigned, are general-
ized and matched to the closest fault scenario for which
the network has been trained. Each approach contains
its own strengths and weaknesses. In order to take ad-
vantage of the strengths of each technique, as well as
avoiding the weaknesses of either we used an integrated
neural network/expert system diagnostic strategy [2, 3].
Dynamic fault management is a critical element of
network management. It is even more dicult in mil-
itary networks because in addition to hard faults and
soft faults (caused by performance degradation) we also
have faults caused by the varying situation and scenario
of the battle. Future military communication networks
will have a mixture of backbone terrestrial, satellite and
wireless terrestrial networks. The speeds of these net-
works varies and they are very heterogeneous. As net-
works become faster, it is not enough to do reactive fault
management. Our approach combines proactive and re-
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active fault management . Proactive fault management
is implemented by dynamic and adaptive routing. Reac-
tive fault management is implemented by a combination
of a neural network and an expert system.
In the work reported here we concentrate on fault
management at the application level. Each applica-
tion generates packets using a Markov Modulated Poi-
son Process (MMPP). We assume two packet priorities,
and non-preemptive queue management. The system
has been developed for the X.25 protocol. The dynamic
routing is based on dynamically adjustable link costs on
the basis of utilization to induce correction via rerout-
ing based on minimum cost. In our model the following
performance data are collected by the network: block-
ing of packets, queue sizes, packets throughput from
all applications, utilization on links connecting subnet-
works, end-to-end delays experienced by packets. Sev-
eral fault scenarios were modeled and included in the
study: reduced switch capacity, increased packet gener-
ation rate of a certain application, disabled switch in the
X.25 cloud, disabled links. These scenario are used to
train the neural network, so as to predictively recognize
the genesis of faults.
We also modeled occurrence of alarms including
severity of the problem, location of the event and a
threshold. Decisions of whether or not to send an alarm
are determined by examining data over a user-specied
time window. We implemented components of SNMP
monitoring based on RFC 1382, including agents and
traps [18, 19, 20]. We have completed a small proto-
type demonstration system which consists of: an OP-
NET simulation of a network and its faults, a MIB,
and a tightly coupled Neural Network and Expert Sys-
tem. We used neural networks based on radial basis
functions. To detect and identify faults we use both
numerical data associated with the performance objects
(attributes) in the MIB as well as SNMP traps (alarms).
Performance data from the X.25 network is supplied as
input to the neural network and data concerning SNMP
statistics, SNMP traps, and alarms are supplied as in-
put to the expert system. We are using both neural
networks and expert systems since all faults cannot be
explained through the use of just alarms or SNMP traps.







Alarms and SNMP information












Figure 1: The overall system
NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND SIMULATION
The network that we have simulated in OPNET is
based on the X.25 protocol. Each user corresponds to a
Data Terminal Equipment (DTE), connected to a Data
Communications Equipment (DCE). Thus, having 10
users implies having 10 DTE/DCE pairs, where each
DTE can have several logical channels. Each DTE can
handle 2 applications, thus making it possible to run up
to 20 applications at a time. There are both permanent
virtual circuits (PVCs) and virtual calls. Four PVCs
have been predened. The PVCs are DTE to DTE con-
nection. In addition to the DTEs and DCEs pertaining
to the X.25 model, there is also a SNMP manager.
In our simulation, the X.25 cloud consists of 15 nodes
used to transmit the packets in a store-and-forward
manner. These 15 nodes are grouped into 3 subnet-
works, where each subnetwork consists of 5 nodes. The
division of the X.25 cloud into subnetworks should be
done so that a single neural network can be appropri-
ately assigned to monitor each subnetwork. A typical
subnetwork is shown in Figure 2.
We have incorporated the following assumptions in
the simulation model. Each application generates
packets using a Markov Modulated Poisson Process
(MMPP). The source sends packets whose sizes are
xed. The MMPP source is used in order to simulate a
bursty trac model for data. The amount of data trans-
fer is established by a random number generator. Each
packet has a priority of 0 (low) or 1 (high), depending
on the user generating the packet. The input and out-
put queues have nite capacity and xed service rate
that are user-specied. The rate of the input queue cor-
responds to the switch rate while the rate of the output
queue corresponds to the link rate. There is a collec-
tion of source/destination DTE pairs. The association
between DTEs is many-to-many, as in electronic mail,
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Figure 2: The overall system.
for example. We used queuing with priorities but non-
preemptive. All the packets (arriving from the various
nodes via the input links) are inserted into one queue.
We performed simulations with widely dierent traf-
c patterns. When running a simulation for T seconds,
we are varying the trac in such a way that there are
periods when trac is high and other periods when traf-
c is light. The performance data being collected con-
sist of statistics about the following parameters: Packet
drop rates, queue sizes, packet throughput from all the
applications, link utilizations, end-to-end delays experi-
enced by packets. In addition, in the simulation we also
have SNMP variables monitored and have implemented
traps.
A MINIMUM COST ROUTING
ALGORITHM
When a packet is created by an application running
on a DTE, it is divided into a number of packets of
xed length (the length can be chosen by the network
designer). In our simulation, the length of each packet
was 128 bytes, the default value as specied in the X.25
Recommendations. A source to destination pair is then
assigned to the message. Based on this pair, a route is
selected from the routing table and is assigned to the
message based on a minimum cost routing algorithm.
We used minimum cost routing based on dynamically
changing link costs, in order to implement some proac-
tive fault management. At the start of the simulation,
all the links have zero cost assigned to them. As the
simulation progresses, this cost is updated periodically
by relating the cost of the link to the utilization on the
link using the following cost function:
ci = (1  )ci 1 + 
1
1  i
where ci is the cost of the link at the i
th time instant
(when the data is sampled), ci 1 is the cost of the link
at the previous time instant,  is a weighting factor be-
tween 0 and 1 (inclusive), and i is the utilization on
the link at the ith time instant. The weighting factor,
, is used in order to take into account the dynamics
of the network. The choice of  is left to the network
designer. In our simulations, we chose  to be a number
greater than 0.5, thus assigning more weight to the cur-
rent value of the utilization. When the utilization of a
link increases, the cost of the link increases also (though
not in a linear fashion). As a result, the trac will be
re-routed through links that are relatively underutilized.
In addition to depending on the source and destina-
tion addresses, this routing algorithm also depends on
the maximum number of hops allowed. This parameter
is specied by the user.
FAULT SCENARIOS AND DATA
The modeling of faults is done as follows. We dene
a normal state in the network, where normal refers
to levels of trac ow that are not unusually low or
high, e.g link utilization between 0.20 and 0.70. Then,
a set of fault scenarios are modeled and used to train the
neural network system. By training the neural network
to understand a normal state of operation, it would then
be able to recognize abnormal states also. The fault
scenarios that we have simulated are the following:
1. Reducing switch capacity, i.e. dropping the service
rate. This would aect dropping of packets and response
times for applications.
2. Increase the (normal) packet generation rate of a
certain application (e.g. 3 times the original amount of
trac).
3. Disabling of certain switches in the X.25 cloud. This
means that the switch is not functional and cannot be
used as a hop for a call. Such a fault would cause re-
routing of calls via other (working) switches.
4. Disabling certain links.
Alarms
A method for simulating the occurrence of alarms is
also incorporated in the simulation. The alarm contains
information regarding the severity of the problem, the
location of the event (i.e. which node in which subnet-
work), and a threshold. The severity levels and alarm
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codes are: critical (5), major (4), minor (3), warning (2),
informational (1), cleared (0). The decision of whether
or not to send an alarm is determined by examining the
sampled data over a user-specied time window.
SNMP Monitoring
In much of the literature that was reviewed [4, 5, 6,
7, 8], there had been little mention regarding the use of
SNMP variables to perform fault management. In our
approach, we are logging statistics pertaining to SNMP
variables based on the RFC 1382, (SNMP MIB Exten-
sion for the X.25 Packet Layer). A list of variables was
extracted from RFC 1382 and were logged during the
simulation. The subset of variables were chosen from
the RFC because they are helpful in identifying faults
that could occur in the X.25 simulation. The variables
are logged on a per DTE basis and not on a per logical
channel basis. This is implemented by assigning IDs to
each DTE.
SNMP Traps
In addition, we also have the facility for agents to
send traps to a manager when something goes wrong.
Here, an agent refers to a node in the X.25 cloud. This
manager is designed to manage the switches in the X.25
cloud. It does not receive traps from the DTEs or DCEs
in the network. According to RFC 1215 (\A Convention
for Dening Traps for use with the SNMP), there are six
basic types of traps, together with a seventh (enterprise-
specic) trap. These are : coldStart(0), warmStart(1),
linkDown(2), linkUp(3), authenticationFailure(4), egp-
NeighborLoss(5), enterpriseSpecic(6). In our simula-
tion, we have implemented traps 2, 3, and 6 above.
EXPERT SYSTEMS AND NEURAL
NETWORKS
OPNET/NEURONLINE Interface
The data from the X.25 simulation in OPNET is gath-
ered in a at le and stored in an ORACLE database.
The data is then read by G2 and Neuronline, where the
former is the expert system and the latter is the neural
network component. After careful review of the alter-
natives we chose radial basis function networks (RBFN)
as the neural network architecture for conducting clas-
sication. In implementing our system, we used a com-
bination of both neural networks and expert systems.
Radial Basis Function Networks
Recently, researchers have been using radial basis
function networks for handling classication problems
[3, 11]. RBFNs are three-layered networks, with an in-
put layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer. Unlike
backpropagation networks, RBFNs use Gaussian trans-
fer functions, one per hidden node. The hidden nodes
have spherical (or elliptical) regions of signicant acti-
vation. The nite bounding of the activation regions en-
ables RBFNs to detect novel cases. Another advantage
of RBFNs is that they require less (typically an order of
magnitude) time for training compared to backpropa-
gation networks. However, they have a slower run-time
execution [11].
The training of RBFNs is done in three stages. In the
rst stage, the center of each of the radial basis function
units is determined using the k-means clustering algo-
rithm. This is an unsupervised technique that places
unit centers centrally among clusters of points. In the
second stage, the unit widths are determined using the
nearest neighbor technique, which ensures the smooth-
ness and continuity of the tted function. In the nal
stage, the weights of the second layer of connections are
found using linear regression.
Network Monitoring
One of the most crucial elements in performing fault
management of networks is speed for fault detection,
fault location, and identication of the type of fault.
For managing the X.25 network, we used a hybrid
architecture of neural networks and expert systems to
perform the fault management functions. Specically,
we used RBFNs to analyze the performance data be-
ing generated by OPNET. There is one RBFN for each
subnetwork. The size and structure of each subnetwork
need not be the same and it is an arbitrary design issue
that is left to the network designer. The possible out-
puts of the neural networks are the dierent classes of
faults that could occur in the X.25 subnetworks. When
a fault occurs within a certain subnetwork, the RBFN
assigned to monitor that subnetwork will alert the net-
work operator that a fault of a specic class (e.g. dis-
abled node) has occured. However, this will not inform
the operator of the location of the fault. Thus, in the
example above, the operator would know that a node in
a specic subnetwork was disabled, but he/she would
not know which node was disabled. Then, based on the
outcome of the neural network, appropriate action is
taken by the expert system. The expert system uses in-
formation about alarms and SNMP traps, together with
the SNMP variables which we chose from RFC 1382, to
make its conclusions regarding the possible location and
cause of the fault. We implemented special rules to han-
dle disabled nodes, others to handle failed links, and so
on.
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FIRST LEVEL OF FAULT DETECTION AND
DIAGNOSIS: NEURAL NETWORKS
We used one radial basis function network for each
subnetwork in the X.25 cloud. In the training phase
for a specic neural network we used the performance
data obtained directly from the network. This data is
then scaled using a data rescaler, which was congured
to use zero mean, unit variance scaling on the input
and no scaling on the output. The scaled data is then
used by the trainer to train the RBFN. A t tester is
also available. The criterion chosen for the t tester is
fraction misclassied. Thus, the output of the t tester
is a number between 0 and 1, reecting how accurately
data samples are classied.
The neural network has spherical nodes for its hidden
layer. The number of hidden nodes per class was chosen
through trial and error, after several training sessions,
until the desired performance is achieved. During our
experiments, it was found that as the number of hidden
nodes increased, the t tester error decreased (though
not linearly), thus implying that there was a better t
of the data by the neural network. However, a higher
number of hidden nodes also meant a longer training
period. The training of the neural networks is aected
by the following factors: The quality of the input data
and how well it reects the conditions of the X.25 net-
work; The number of hidden nodes in the hidden layer
of the RBFN; The number of input variables that are
supplied to the neural network (we supplied the uti-
lization levels on all the links, the queue sizes, and the
measured packet throughput at each node); The dis-
criminating characteristics of data for faults occuring
simultaneously.
Since a neural network observes patterns and makes
inferences based on those patterns, similar patterns for
dierent fault classes would lead to misclassications.
In several experiments, when one node in a subnetwork
was blocked, the average queue size of other nodes in
the subnetwork increased drastically, beginning at the
time of the node blockage. This occurs as a result of
re-routing of the X.25 calls. In such cases, there are
certain distinct patterns that help the neural network
to identify the dierent cases. However, there are other
instances when it is more dicult. For example, a link
failure and a node failure both lead to re-routing of traf-
c. If the samples of training data are small, it is very
dicult for the neural network to distinguish between a
node failure and a link failure, simply by analyzing the
re-routing that occurs. Thus, more data is needed to
Neural Network Training: 5 Classes
Total % Error % Error % Error % Error % Error
Hidden Normal Disabled Excess Degraded Disabled
Nodes State Node Thrput Buer Link
175 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.21
200 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.18
210 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.15
230 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.11
Table 1: Neural network training chart for the third
test.
distinguish between the re-routing that occurs in these
two cases in order to have a small percentage of mis-
classication; and this was veried by our experiments.
Since there is no xed method to train neural net-
works, we arbitrarily selected a few dierent test cases
to develop a better understanding of how the neural net-
works were trained. The data obtained from the simu-
lations in OPNET was divided so that two-thirds was
used for training and one-third for testing. In the rst
test, we considered 3 classes (normal, disabled node, and
excess user trac). We used 180 samples of data for the
normal class and 90 samples for each of the other two
classes. In the second test, we repeated the rst test
but, changed the number of samples of training data
to 180 samples per class and retrained the RBFN net-
works. Comparison of the results indicates that with
more data points per class, the total number of hidden
nodes decreases for a certain range of error values for
the t tester.
In the third test, we considered all ve classes of faults
and trained the RBFNs with dierent sample sizes. We
rst trained the RBFN with 150 samples for the normal
class and 80 samples for each of the other fault classes,
giving a total of 470 points in the training set. The
results for this case are shown in Table 1. By looking
at the last two columns in each row, it is observed that
the percentage error is higher for those two fault classes.
This provided the motivation for the next test.
In the fourth and nal test, we again considered all
ve classes of faults and trained the RBFNs with dif-
ferent sample sizes. We trained the RBFN with 180
samples each for the normal, disabled node, and ex-
cess user trac classes. For the remaining two faults
classes, we used 320 samples for each class giving a to-
tal of 1180 points in the training set. The reason for this
is because these two cases do not manifest themselves in
an obvious manner through the performance data from
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Neural Network Training: 5 Classes
Total % Error % Error % Error % Error % Error
Hidden Normal Disabled Excess Degraded Disabled
Nodes State Node Thrput Buer Link
60 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08
80 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07
100 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
125 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
Table 2: Neural network training chart for the fourth
test.
the network. When the training for these two cases was
performed with 180 samples per class, the percentage of
misclassication was very high (approximately 0.40 for
each fault class). On the other hand, when we tried us-
ing 500 samples for each of these two classes, the RBFN
was overtrained and all data points (from the testing
data) were classied either as degraded buer or link
failed. Thus, we had to use an intermediate number of
points between these two extreme cases of training and
the results for this case are shown in Table 2.
After analyzing the behavior of the network under
fault conditions in several experiments, it appears that
the network topology inuences the neural networks
ability to discriminate faults. Since all occurrences of
a particular fault class are not identical, several dier-
ent cases need to be presented to the RBFN for the
same fault class. Obviously, this corresponds to longer
training sessions for the neural networks. Similar obser-
vations were also recorded for the other fault classes.
The output of the neural network is used by a classi-
er to inform the network operator of the current sta-
tus of the network; the neural network outputs a fault
code. If a certain fault code is observed several times
(e.g. K times out of M samples), then the expert sys-
tem is activated to determine further information about
the location and cause of the fault, as described in the
next section.
SECOND LEVEL OF FAULT DETECTION
AND DIAGNOSIS: EXPERT SYSTEMS
The neural network for each subnetwork analyzes the
incoming data and if a state other than a normal one
appears to be present, then the expert system makes
queries to an ORACLE database to determine further
information about the observed fault in the network.
Dierent fault conditions induce dierent queries, as de-
scribed below.
Single Faults
To detect a node failure at node i, the algorithm rst
searches for a SNMP trap. Reception of a trap would
solve the problem. If, due to some problem in the net-
work, the trap was not received by the SNMP manager
(a feature that exists in our simulation), then we ex-





In our implementation, we set  = 0:01.
To conrm the hypothesis, we examine:
1. x25StatCallTimeouts counter at the DTEs that are
the \source" part of the source/destination pairs for the
DTEs connected to node i.
2. x25StatOutCallFailures, x25StatOutCallAttempts
counters at the source DTE.
To detect a user connected to node i that is submitting




To conrm the hypothesis, we check:
1. x25StatOutDataPackets at the DTEs connected to
node i.
2. Measured packet throughput at node i.
3. x25StatInDataPackets at the destination DTE, i.e.
node i, obtained by checking the source/destination
pairs in the case of PVCs.
4. x25StatInCalls at the destination DTE, obtained
by checking the source/destination pairs in the case of
PVCs.
To detect a degraded switch, the algorithm rst searches
for a SNMP trap. Reception of a trap would solve the
problem. To conrm the hypothesis, we check the fol-
lowing:
1. Alarms corresponding to high queue sizes and/or
blocking of packets.
2. High end{to{end delays experienced by packets.
To detect a link failure on link (i; j), the algorithm rst
searches for a SNMP trap. Reception of a trap would
solve the problem. If the SNMP manager does not re-
ceive a trap, then we execute a query from the expert
system looking for the following condition: nd i and j
such that
ij = 0 and ji = 0:




In the case of multiple faults, we simply need to exam-
ine the outputs of the RBFN neural networks and deter-
mine which ones do not correspond to normal trac. By
doing so, we eliminate a large number of nodes in the
X.25 network and we can focus on those subnetworks
that are experiencing problems. In the work to date,
we did not consider multiple faults occurring simultane-
ously within the same subnetwork since the probability
of occurrence of such an event is much smaller than the
probability of occurrence of multiple faults within dif-
ferent subnetworks. In the event of faults occurring in
one subnetwork, with the resulting eects propagating
to another subnetwork, the RBFNs of both subnetworks
would indicate problem situations and the results of the
queries from both subnetworks would have to be exam-
ined.
These strategies were validated with the simulation
results from OPNET. One should note that the rules
which were constructed for the expert system are driven
by the X.25 network architecture. It is possible that dif-
ferent architectures would probably use the above rules
with some modications.
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